Along with military goals, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative serves a variety of economic purposes with strategic undertones. Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States, Australia, and India are seeking to increase their regional political leverage, favour their export industries, and shield regional countries from economic dependency on China.

America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are not necessarily competitors.

ASEAN nations are seeking clarity on who makes the best ally in the Indo-Pacific: China or the United States.

The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific Vision is not an alternative to Chinese and other development initiatives in the Asia Pacific. It is a geopolitical play that is likely to benefit mainly advanced economies. What the Asia Pacific needs is a sustainable, long-term plan for accelerated economic development – not new geopolitical divisions.

Though the United States has been pushing its allies in the Indo-Pacific region to help it contain China, this policy is both misguided and unlikely to succeed.

At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, three competing narratives of the Indo-Pacific came to light. Which will become the governing paradigm of this increasingly important region?

The U.S. military has renamed its Pacific Command, introducing the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to the world. But is this a simple name change or a more significant gesture that could signal changes in the Indian-Pacific alliance structure?

The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy is aimed at deterring Chinese coercion by deepening alliances and strategic partnerships. To this end, Japan has enhanced military cooperation with partners such as the United States and India to balance against Beijing’s more assertive foreign and security policy under Xi Jinping.

Is the Trump administration’s strategy a credible threat to the Belt and Road Initiative?

The NSS indicates a turn towards a more confrontational United States.