Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Sep 27 , 2017
Beijing and Washington do not want Iran or North Korea to possess nuclear weapons, test ballistic missiles, or engage in WMD proliferation. Despite their overlapping positions, the differences between the Trump and Xi administrations regarding these issues have been growing. Confidence-building and stability-enhancing measures could narrow these differences.
Jul 07 , 2017
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization achieved a major boost in momentum at last month’s Astana summit, but realizing its potential will require consistent leadership and resources over the coming year from the Chinese presidency.
Jun 07 , 2017
U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ speech used the Shangri-La Asia Security Dialogue as a platform to criticize some Chinese actions, but also offer options for cooperation regarding Korea. He reassured allies, reaffirmed alliances, and expressed a generally cooperative stance to resolving international challenges.
Mar 15 , 2017
Despite China’s economic slowdown, the Chinese government has plans under its "Made in China 2025" program to spend $300 billion by 2025 to become self-sufficient in critical technologies and strategic emerging industries. U.S. unease at the size and opaqueness of China’s large military buildup are well-known. The latest developments will likely lead the Trump administration to continue efforts to reduce Russian defense technology transfers to China, sustain the EU arms embargo on China, and make U.S. weapons and other U.S. exports more competitive in global markets.
Feb 15 , 2017
Political, pragmatic, and bureaucratic factors have been pushing Trump to pursue more traditional foreign and security policies. His response to the North Korean missile launch, meeting with visiting Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and recognition of the One China principle resembled those of previous presidents. However, Trump still has major differences with Japan and China, while his continuing Obama’s North Korean policy of castigating the regime, working with other countries like China to apply additional sanctions, deploying regional missile defenses, and refusing to engage with Pyongyang until it recommits to ending its nuclear program will likely still not yield appreciable results besides giving North Korea time to perfect its nuclear and missile capabilities.
Jan 13 , 2017
This year could see a major shakeup in the China-U.S. interaction in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Until now, the relationships in these regions between China and the United States, and between China and Russia, has been better than the Russian-American rivalry in Central Asia. But if the new Trump administration succeeds in improving Russian-U.S. relations, or decides to cut back on the U.S. military commitment in Afghanistan, China’s bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Russia in Central Asia will decline.
Nov 14 , 2016
China has accepted some gains from the world order established by the United States, but they disapprove of how the structure reflects exclusively American values and is buttressed “by a military alignment, which does not take into consideration the security interests of others.” Some Chinese commentators can also see a great benefit to aligning with Russia to offset the U.S.; however, uncertainty about regional powers and IGO influence remains pivotal to the current great-power structure.
Oct 13 , 2016
Recent speeches given to the UN General Assembly by the U.S. and China illustrate sharp differences in areas such as domestic political systems, appropriate roles and relationships in world politics, and dispute resolution. Russia backed China on many points that the U.S. opposes. These disagreements will continue to play a large role in shaping the international arena.
Sep 15 , 2016
The death of President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan could engender major changes in the Sino-Russian relationship in Central Asia, despite Beijing and Moscow maintaining a harmonious, if not especially close, partnership in the region for years.
Aug 10 , 2016
Following months of assessment by a Joint Working Group, the U.S. Defense Department announced in July that the U.S. Forces Korea Command will station a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea “as a defensive measure to ensure the security of the nation and its people, and to protect alliance military forces from North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats.”