Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the United States is an important opportunity to carry forward his grandfather's legacy in seeking equal status with the U.S. in the area of security. “Abenomics,” which gives top priority to the "price of capital," features bold financial policy and flexible fiscal policy will not be compromised for the U.S.-backed TPP, though.

The U.S. state visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will be remembered not only because few foreign leaders have been privileged to address a joint session of Congress, but for the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Neither Washington nor Tokyo should explicitly link a more robust U.S.-Japan relationship with deterrence against China’s rise.

A key component of Washington’s military rebalancing strategy is improving its relationship with Japan. However, actions by Abe and some close associates reinforce suspicions of the attempt to legitimize imperialism through revised textbooks, visits by the PM to the Yasukuni Shrine, and reluctance to accept the history of “comfort women.”

Previous U.S.-China issues of friction are becoming magnified again: Taiwai-Strait militarization, tension on the Korean Peninsula, maritime tension in the East and South China Seas, and security issues in cyberspace. Zhang Tuosheng calls on both nations to improve their desire to not seek conflict as a solution, strengthen and improve their liaison mechanism, enhance the role of research, and hold joint meetings.

Abe must understand – and the U.S. should exert pressure on him – that the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II is prime time for him to profoundly reflect on Japan’s wartime crimes. If Abe goes too far in the wrong direction, there will be no peace in the Asia-Pacific and the hard-won beginning of a Sino-Japanese détente may vanish.

Britain has broken ranks with the United States to join China in the founding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As other nations like Australia and South Korea choose to similarly defy U.S. opposition to the AIIB, and join, it could shake Japan’s confidence in its own position and even in the reliability of its alliance with the U.S.

Jin Ying warns the U.S. to be weary of Japan, citing their history of “running away with the bone” as the U.S. and China jostle for influence in the Pacific. Ying agrees with Democratic advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski that the U.S. should sign a major charter with China, just as it did with Britain during WWII.

Zhou Bo posits that an essential component to improving frosty Japan-China relations is an equal commitment to develop shared maritime procedures, such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). But first, the two sides need to agree upon a common Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Although Xi and Abe agreed to deemphasize their conflict over the East China Sea, past efforts in this direction have not proved successful for long. Last month’s release of the interim report on Japanese-U.S. progress in revising their defense guidelines has become the latest object of Chinese concern.

Japan and the US are revising defense guidelines for the first time since 1997, and though not explicit, China’s sovereignty claims are the cause. Yet both Japan and China are making slight efforts to defuse escalation and reemphasize communication.