The report lays out the differing strategic perceptions of the United States and China with respect to some of the most topical and challenging issues on the U.S.-China agenda today. These starkly differing perceptions inform and exacerbate actual policy and fuel mistrust and broad mutual strategic suspicion.

North does not threaten America geographically as two nations do not share a land border, but President Trump apparently is certain that Pyongyang’s weapons programs are Washington’s problem. This prospect has pushed the Trump administration into frenetic if not necessarily productive activity.

China must reconsider its approach to the DPRK nuclear issue, reverse its passive strategic position, and not equate the security of North Korea with the security of the Kim regime. Beijing should openly state that it will neither allow a war in North Korea, nor merely look on while North Korea becomes Northeast Asia’s “Middle East”.

The Moon government, with its sensible domestic and foreign policy approaches, is set to foster momentum and real opportunities to take the heat out of the tension in the region. The rest of the world should support and embrace such positive dynamics.

As economic globalization moves forward and the newly emerged economies become more integrated with the developed ones, the whole world is concentrating on economic development. The main trend of the times is for peace, and against war. The U.S. should give up the idea that a certain degree of controlled tension on the Korean peninsula consolidates its permanent deployment of troops there.

The nature of Washington’s alliance network was always based on the assumption that the United States was firmly in charge of policy decisions. The risk inherent to America’s allies from that arrangement is now becoming increasingly evident.

Those who predict that a Moon presidency will disrupt South Korean relations with the U.S. and Japan are surely mistaken.

The new president seeks economic advantages in the Asia-Pacific, though his approach is very different from Obama’s in ends and means. He has reset the goals for US trade, focusing on the more short-term, inward-looking national interest based on more jobs and investments for US. But all in all, there is more continuity than change in what we’ve seen of the administration’s policy in the region.

A salience-based bargain considers the salience each country considers as its core interest. When applied to China-U.S. relations, it could be helpful in making concessions on both sides in order to come to an agreement on dealing with North Korea.

Despite China’s best efforts as an intermediary, Pyongyang has obviously stood on the wrong side of history, against the will of the rest of the world by refusing peaceful engagement. But the six-party talks platform has not been built easily, and it remains the key to meaningful progress.