2025 has brought swift changes across the Indo-Pacific, and the Philippines’ growing involvement with Trump’s policies and the Taiwan question could prove to be one of the most pivotal factors in the future of the region.
Philippine marines Commandant Major General Arturo Rojas (left), and U.S. marines Colonel Jason Armas (second from left) commanding officer marine rotational force-Darwin 25.3, unfurl the exercise flag during the opening ceremony of the “Kamandag” annual military exercise between the U.S. and Philippines in Manila on 26 May 2025. (Photo: Ted Aljibe/AFP)
This year’s Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) exercises between the Philippines and the U.S. have not gone exactly as planned. A showcase drill in the South China Sea flopped when a decommissioned World War II corvette, the former BRP Miguel Malvar (PS-19), prematurely sank even before American, Filipino and Australian troops flexed their muscle and growing military interoperability. The decrepit warship was supposed to be targeted and sunk off the Naval Education Training Command in San Antonio, Zambales, by a joint naval and air force operation to showcase enhanced military cooperation among the allied nations.
Nevertheless, the 40th edition of the Balikatan exercises (BK 40-2025) underscored broad continuity in Philippine-U.S. strategic relations and, more broadly, reflected the “Asia First” orientation of the second Trump administration’s foreign policy, which perturbed traditional allies in Europe and West Asia. Easily among the largest joint exercises between the U.S. and any regional partner, as many as 6,000 Filipino soldiers joined 12,000 U.S. counterparts along with troops from Japan and Australia, which have alliance treaties with Washington and visiting forces agreements with Manila. Crucially, an expanded contingent of European nations served as observers, with the Netherlands, Poland, Lithuania and Czech Republic joining the ‘Big Three’ powers of Britain, France, and Germany.
In addition to the sheer scale of the exercises, their nature and location are equally remarkable. The weeks-long drills this year, stretching from April 21 all the way to May 9, simulated nothing less than a "full-scale battle scenario" and, crucially, saw the deployment of advanced weapons systems by chief participating nations. The Americans deployed the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) missile launcher while the Filipinos used their most potent anti-ship weapon – the South Korean-made LIG NEX 1 C-Star "sea-skimming" surface-to-surface cruise missile.
On its part, the Philippines also deployed its latest batch of Indian-made Brahmos supersonic missile system just as the Americans signaled the possible deployment of a second Typhon battery to the region despite vociferous opposition by Beijing. The latest Balikatan exercises were ostensibly about enhancing maritime security interoperability among the U.S. and its frontline allies in Asia. But it also reflected a burgeoning “Wall of Missiles” in Western Pacific, with Washington hoping to deploy advanced weapons systems stretching from Guam and southern Japan all the way to northernmost provinces of the Philippines in order to constrain China’s resurgence as the dominant military power in Asia. Ultimately, it signals an “Asia First” continuity in Washington, despite the second Trump administration’s generally disruptive foreign policy.
An Air of Continuity
The latest Balikatan exercises came on the heels of major developments, both diplomatically and geopolitically. For one, it came just weeks after U.S. Defense Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s visit to Manila, where he underscored the second Trump administration’s “iron-clad commitment” to Manila and emphasized the need for enhancing joint “deterrence” capabilities against “Communist China’s aggression in the region.”
Hegseth, in continuity with the Biden administration, maintained that the U.S. is “truly prioritize[ing] a shift [to Asia], recognizing “that for the 21st century to be a free century, America needs to stand alongside our allies and partners shoulder to shoulder.”
To reassure his hosts, the U.S. defense chief announced the deployment of the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) for this year’s Balikatan exercises, one the biggest on the record, as well as new major defense deals. In particular, the second Trump administration cleared the sale of as many as 20 F-16 fighter jets to the Philippine Airforce under a whopping $5.58 billion contract.
The deal, which is yet to be finalized, carried huge operational and symbolic value. For decades, the Philippines has struggled to modernize its airforce capabilities due to financial constraints, institutional corruption, shifting procurement priorities, and lack of maintenance capabilities. “This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a strategic partner that continues to be an important force for political stability, peace, and economic progress in Southeast Asia,” the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said in a statement.
The new fighter jet deal reportedly involves two major variants, namely 16 F-16Cs (single-seat, single-engine) and four F-16Ds (dual-seat jets for training purposes). Although a fourth-generation fighter developed half-a-century earlier, the Philippines is eying the newest block 70/72 version of the storied fighter jet. Unlike its critical stance towards other treaty allies, namely calling on Japan, Europe and Taiwan to dramatically ramp up their defense spending, the second Trump administration has promised to expand defense aid to the Philippines.
China has made its displeasure with the Philippines’ actions clear, accusing the Southeast Asian nation of provoking tensions in the region by more overtly aligning with America. “Any defense and security cooperation that the Philippines engages in with other countries should not target or harm the interests of any third party, nor should it threaten regional peace and security or escalate tensions in the region,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said in response to latest U.S.-Philippine defense deals.
Into Deep Waters
The latest Balikatan exercises also came on the heels of rising tensions in the South China Sea, especially after both the Philippines and China stepped up their claims over the hotly-contested Sandy Cay in the Spratlys group of islands. The feature lies just a few miles off the coast of the Philippine-controlled Thitu Island, which hosts a significant Philippine military detachment and an airstrip, as well as the China-controlled Subi Reef, which also hosts Chinese troops and advanced facilities.
What made this year’s Balikatan exercises, which extended from Philippine coastlines in the South China Sea to the Luzon Strait, even more poignant was the Taiwan dimension. Shortly before the massive Philippine-U.S. drills, Philippine military chief General Romeo Brawner signaled his country’s growing involvement in any potential U.S.-led counterstrategy should Beijing decide to take kinetic action to ‘re-unify’ with Taiwan.
“Start planning for actions in case there is an invasion of Taiwan…Because if something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved," the Philippines’ top general declared during a visit to the country’s main northern military command center. "As members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, we should have that mentality that we are already at war."
Brawner even went so far as alleging that "communist China is already conducting united front works in our country" and accused the Asian superpower of “already infiltrating our institutions, our schools, our businesses, our churches, even our ranks in the military.” He warned against alleged "cyber warfare, information warfare, cognitive warfare, [and] political warfare" by China-aligned elements, but refused to provide any specific details.
The statements by the top Philippine general reflects the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration’s increasing involvement in the Taiwan question. For years, Manila tried to project quasi-neutrality on the issue and maintained strategic ambiguity on whether it would be involved in any major contingency plan.
After all, even former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink welcomed, at least officially, a balanced position by Southeast Asian nations on U.S.-China rivalry: “We don’t want [developing] countries to have to choose between us and [China]. But we want to help ensure that they have a choice and that they can make their decisions free from coercion.”
President Marcos Jr. sent mixed signals on the Taiwan issue throughout the Biden administration. The Filipino president denied that, for instance, the U.S. facilities in northern Philippines under an expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) would be used for ‘offensive’ purposes in an event of contingency. The Philippines also reconsidered a major infrastructure project with the Pentagon in the northernmost province of Batanes.
Since last year, however, the Philippine defense establishment and top strategists have steadily pushed greater involvement on the Taiwan question, since, as former Philippine admiral Rommel Jude Ong has argued, “[I]f we lose Taiwan, then China becomes our neighbor. And our [entire] northern territories will be under threat.”
Last year, the Philippines strengthened the country’s military presence in northern provinces. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. vowed, during a visit to northern Philippine bases in early-2024, “the operational tempo for the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) will be higher” and that the Batanes will be “spearhead of the Philippines as far as the northern baseline is concerned.” Recently, the Philippine military also began direct official engagement with Taipei-based counterparts to China’s chagrin. Eager to win over the second Trump administration, Manila seems to have more decisively entered the Taiwan question. This may win Washington’s favor, but will have serious ramifications for Philippine-China bilateral relations.
