The U.S.-Israel strike on Iran lacks a clear legal basis or credible justification and represents a high-risk gamble by the Trump administration. Despite early military success, the operation faces uncertain prospects, including limited chances of regime change and the risk of prolonged conflict.

The death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in U.S.-Israeli strikes has created leadership uncertainty in Tehran, weakened Iran’s regional network of allies, and accelerated shifts in Middle Eastern power dynamics. For China, the conflict threatens energy supplies and Belt and Road investments while potentially expanding Beijing’s diplomatic role if it maintains neutrality and engagement with all sides.

Reaffirming legal limits is not an act of idealism. It is one of prudence. Strategic stability is not self-sustaining. It must be actively maintained. And in the nuclear age, maintenance begins not only with capability but with responsibility.

Critics of the attack on Iran by the United States and Israel point out that US President Donald Trump has no plan for what comes next. And they are not wrong: when Trump boasts that he can resolve wars in a single day, he merely exposes the limits of his attention span. But the real problem is not the shortness of Trump’s time horizon; it’s the narrowness of his threat perception.

China declined an opportunity to join Iran in its June 2025 confrontation with the United States and Israel. Though Beijing enjoys good relations with the Iranian regime, competing alignments and other considerations convinced PRC policymakers to adopt a low profile during the twelve-day war.

Attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities showed the pragmatism of U.S. foreign policy. The airstrikes were neither purely isolationist nor ideologically preemptive. Instead, they were a calibrated, interest-driven move to neutralize a threat while avoiding overcommitment.

The answer will depend on whom you ask. But one thing is certain, the attacks by Israel and the United States on Iran’s nuclear facilities did not advance the cause of peace in the Middle East. They only added to suspicions and made a resolution more difficult to attain

In 1966, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China not only were the only countries that possessed nuclear weapons; they also had enough wisdom to recognize the dangers posed by nuclear proliferation. Despite their many and deep political differences, they arrived at a consensus to halt the further dissemination of “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

The bunker-busting strike by United States will only harden the resolve of many in Iran to push for nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the two countries may fall into a pattern of “attack-retaliate-attack,” which could develop into one of the biggest failures in human history.

The three-way meeting in Beijing stood out for its effort to clarify the historical context of the Iranian nuclear issue and to present impartial, fair and equitable demands to all parties involved.