Donald Trump’s ascension to the presidency in 2017 will also make him the new commander-in-chief of the United States Armed Forces, with a large say over the question of war and peace in the next four years. While some see his strongman style as reminiscent of Theodore Roosevelt’s Gunboat Diplomacy, there are too many known unknowns about Trump’s defense policies to predict how he would react in the event of war or a perceived threat.

American foreign policy debates tend to focus disproportionally on the Middle East. To correct this tendency, the Obama administration’s adopted the so-called pivot to Asia (aka “rebalancing”): to refocus U.S. policy in proper proportion to the full range of the nation’s challenges and interests. Indeed, this broader perspective on today’s interconnected world and diligent approach to building the necessary coalitions, are the main elements that distinguish Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton’s pragmatic approach from the Republicans’ bullheaded approach.

Both Russian and the West have lost face in this typical lose-lose situation. Moscow and Washington need to rebuild trust, reactivate the process of political resolution and produce a single draft resolution based on full consultation and the most expansive common ground among all parties.

No matter how the wrangling over THAAD evolves, it will ignite strategic gaming as well as new and high military technology competition among major powers. Pentagon planners may be rejoicing over the ROK decision to embrace the American project, but the US will have no control over the reaction to the deployment.

China’s diplomatic ideal is to establish an international relationship where countries treat each other on equal footing and work together for common security, mutual benefit and joint development. China does not challenge anybody else but does not fear any challenge either, and will not allow its core interests to be jeopardized. Pursuing peace, cooperation and joint development is the only right way to follow.

Beijing and Washington have the shared goal of fighting terrorism and extremism in the region despite modest differences on the ways to address the problem. China’s efforts to engage the region economically, not militarily, relieves pressures that lead to extremization, and should therefore be appreciated by the U.S.

The U.S. decision to remove all restrictions on arms sales to Vietnam does not aim to militarize the South China Sea dispute or contain China. Rather, the decision was but the latest move among the great powers to pursue their interests in Southeast Asia, which for the United States focus on discouraging China or anyone else from using military power to pursue a coercive solution to territorial conflicts.

Whereas aircraft carriers have long provided the U.S. naval primacy as floating islands, China is creating its own artificial islands, complete with deep channels, harbors, berthing areas and airfields, all manned by thousands of troops, to counter that primacy. The consequences of a military clash could easily be disastrous and must be avoided. The politics of keeping the overall U.S.-China relationship on track is a particular challenge in the U.S. during a presidential election year, when candidates are posturing to an unexpectedly populist electorate.

The arbitration tribunal has put its own authority in question by redefining the case against China put before it by the Philippines. All nations should be concerned about what would become of China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea if we let UNCLOS serve as the sole exclusionary source of such entitlements.

Differences over freedom of navigation mainly originate from different interpretations of UNCLOS. As China extends the reaches of its maritime power, the operational capability at sea of the PLA Navy may be constrained due to the question of EEZ jurisdiction, which will invite cooperation with the US at appropriate times. The two countries would benefit from developing a common language on freedom of navigation.