When the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other U.S. allies decided to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 amidst clear opposition from Washington, some questioned whether it meant the transatlantic relationship was weakening in the face of a rising China. In terms of risk, rebalancing, and reward, however, the AIIB was not a situation that pitted Europe’s relationship with the U.S. against its relationship with China. Such a case may offer insight when considering the Paris Agreement and Europe’s actions if faced with choices between Washington and Beijing.

While the new French leader will focus an enormous amount of resources on domestic reform, he will also try to accomplish something big in foreign affairs. As a pro-EU president of France, Macron will make the restart of the Franco-German engine his primary task.

The Trump administration has been surprisingly brusque with demands that NATO allies meet their financial defense targets quickly. However, the US push for more military spending by European allies is less about European security than about freeing up more of Washington’s own resources to deal with issues in Asia.

However histrionic the demagogic oratory of President Trump has been, his strategy to revitalize American manufacturing will be better served by exporting more to China, not decreasing Chinese imports. China’s gigantic market has thus become the golden apple of discord in an accelerating geo-economic competition between the United States and Germany, which already enjoys significant production networks within the Middle Kingdom. Yet unlike the days of the Boxer Revolution and the alliance of eight Western nations, China can this time choose her major commercial partners.

However histrionic the demagogic oratory of President Trump has been, his strategy to revitalize American manufacturing will be better served by exporting more to China, not decreasing Chinese imports. China’s gigantic market has thus become the golden apple of discord in an accelerating geo-economic competition between the United States and Germany, which already enjoys significant production networks within the Middle Kingdom. Yet unlike the days of the Boxer Revolution and the alliance of eight Western nations, China can this time choose her major commercial partners.

China wishes both the EU and the UK prosperity and success in the future. With Brexit having little relevance in China-EU relations, it should not become a distraction in developing and improving ties.

The relationship between China and the United Kingdom was close, especially in economic terms, though as Jonathan Holslag argues, China may need to find a new preferred partner. Europe is at a juncture: it remains to be seen whether frustration about alleged unfair competition from China will lead to a much more protectionist trade policy, whether the European Commission grants China Market Economy Status, and whether a fragmented European position on trade could strengthen China’s own geopolitical position.

The EU has long served as a magnifier of the UK’s role in the world. It is hard to imagine how the UK would punch above its weight in today’s world, even for a nation that boasts of past world hegemon status, unrivalled experience in global engagement and continuing hard power.

EU engagement in Central Asia has been reactive than proactive. U.S. withdrawal in Afghanistan, and the amalgamation of EU expertise and the Chinese financial power may significantly help mitigate the effects of poverty in Central Asia. Yet, at this stage these prospects are detached from the reality and embody rather normative aspirations.