Samuel S. Kim, Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University
Sep 01, 2017
To follow a common security approach that recognizes the interrelations and interdependencies between countries, Washington must step back and reassess the moral and practical implications of its foreign-policy commandment “Do as I say, Not as I do” when it comes to nuclear weapons.
Cui Lei, Research Fellow, China Institute of International Studies
Jul 18, 2017
Changing the goal from denuclearization to resuming talks is something worth trying, since other options are becoming dead ends or getting increasingly risky.
Ma Xiaolin, Professor, School of Arabic Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University
Jul 14, 2017
The proposal from Beijing and Moscow could push the Korea nuclear crisis out of its dead-end. Yet there is a very long way to go for that to happen, considering the deep-rooted mutual prejudices, suspicions and the extreme lack of strategic trust.
Yu Sui, Professor, China Center for Contemporary World Studies
May 02, 2017
Despite China’s best efforts as an intermediary, Pyongyang has obviously stood on the wrong side of history, against the will of the rest of the world by refusing peaceful engagement. But the six-party talks platform has not been built easily, and it remains the key to meaningful progress.
May 02, 2017
The Korean nuclear issue is the most complicated and uncertain factor for Northeast Asian security. It has now become the focus of attention in the Asia Pacific and even the world at large. Now, as the issue continues to heat up, one frequently raised question is: Why can’t China take greater responsibility and make North Korea stop its nuclear weapons program?
Wu Zurong, Research Fellow, China Foundation for Int'l Studies
Apr 27, 2017
The current crisis is not an isolate event, but the result of 60 years of failed attempts to resolve the conflict. Relations among regional players have a key role, and improving strategic trust between China and the US would be a first step toward establishing enough trust to begin talks between the US and the DPRK.
Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute
Mar 08, 2017
Ironically, in launching its economic campaign to protest South Korean deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system, Beijing is effectively doing Washington’s bidding. U.S. policymakers long have worried about the PRC’s economic draw on the South. As China voluntarily curbs those ties, American officials couldn’t be happier.
Fan Gaoyue, Guest Professor at Sichuan University, Former Chief Specialist at PLA Academy of Military Science
Feb 27, 2017
Participants in the Six Party Talks can take four paths to progress: Make denuclearization of the Peninsula their collective top priority; make a military strike an option as talks resume; initiate peace treaty talks concurrently; and take confidence-building steps to make negotiations more inviting.
He Wenping, Senior Research Fellow, Charhar Institute and West Asia and Africa Studies Institute of the China Academy of Social Sciences
Dec 20, 2016
If the US should abandon or violate the Iranian nuclear accord, an agreement reached after years of negotiation and with consent of European allies, the results would only be negative for the US in terms of its international image, moral high ground and Trump’s start on diplomatic front. Such a move would signal to the world that the US cannot be trusted.
Darcie Draudt, non-resident James A. Kelly Korean Studies fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS
Sep 02, 2016
In early July, South Korea decided to allow the United States to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. At the heart of this issue is the difference in how China and the United States view the role of South Korea and decisions related to the security and stability of the peninsula.