Nepal’s EV surge, powered by Chinese technology and domestic hydropower, has displaced India’s industrial influence and exposed weaknesses in Delhi’s regional strategy. While it marks a shift in regional power, the transformation remains fragile, reliant on subsidies and foreign supply chains.

Since the U.S.-China trade war began in April, Chinese companies have faced high tariffs and economic uncertainty, prompting them to reshore production to the U.S., shift manufacturing to developing countries, and diversify into other markets. Despite higher costs and regulatory challenges, they are balancing supply chain stability with expansion in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Europe to maintain their low-cost business models.

Be careful what you wish for, lest it come true. That ancient proverb comes to mind when considering the eagerness of America’s trade partners around the world to negotiate deals with US President Donald Trump’s administration. Four countries already have, with Indonesia the latest to do so – and possibly the first to regret it.

Regional trade alliances and economic integration — especially the one emerging between China, ASEAN and countries in the Persian Gulf — are offering stability for a global economy on the edge. The world’s poles are shifting to fill the gap left by an increasingly isolationist United States.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs – especially the ultra-high “reciprocal tariffs” that he says will be reintroduced on July 8 for any country that has not struck a trade deal with his administration – have sent countries around the world scrambling to respond, adapt, and limit the fallout. ASEAN’s ten members – Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam – have been among the most proactive.

America’s tariff agenda has taken global trade hostage to begin this year. While the strongman tactics employed by Trump’s administration are netting favorable results in some ways, China has been able to hold out from the pressure, showing flaws in America’s plan.

In April 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping conducted a five-day diplomatic tour of Southeast Asia, visiting Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia from April 14 to 18. The strategically timed visit, Xi’s first overseas trip of the year, occurred amid escalating trade tensions driven by U.S. President Donald Trump’s imposition of tariffs on over 70 countries, including China and the three nations Xi visited. The tour aimed to reinforce China’s economic and diplomatic influence in the region, counter U.S. trade policies, and solidify partnerships within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Ten years after its launch, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has underperformed, with many key projects stalled due to Pakistan's political mismanagement and inefficiencies. While China continues to support the initiative diplomatically, its future success depends on Pakistan’s ability to implement strategic reforms and restore investor confidence.

Speculation about a "Grand Bargain" between Trump and Xi persists, but deep divisions within Washington, Trump’s erratic leadership, and Beijing’s long-term strategic patience make a major breakthrough unlikely. Even if a meeting occurs, structural mistrust and political instability on both sides suggest any deal would be fragile at best.

For many nations, a highly profitable trade relationship with the United States is now no longer a given. With President Trump’s tariff agenda looming over the world, how is Asia planning for a future where the U.S. may not be so open for business?