Following months of assessment by a Joint Working Group, the U.S. Defense Department announced in July that the U.S. Forces Korea Command will station a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea “as a defensive measure to ensure the security of the nation and its people, and to protect alliance military forces from North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats.”

Seoul should fully understand the consequences of THAAD in the ROK, reverse the deployment decision and cooperate with countries concerned in an effort to force the DPRK to abandon its nuclear project and mitigate the tense situation in the Korean Peninsula. THAAD will only produce two winners: the U.S. and the DPRK.

The U.S. Defense Department recently announced that the U.S. Forces Korea Command will station a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a defensive measure against North Korea. But Russian and Chinese representatives have expressed concern about how THAAD could affect strategic stability, alliance relations, and global influence.

The missile-defense deployment will worsen the bifurcation in East Asia, where regional arrangements for economic growth are shaped with China at its core while regional security architecture is set up with the US-centered military alliances as its foundation. Should this contradictory situation evolve, neither regional economic growth nor security could be sustained.

China must keep in mind its significant interests in multiple aspects of the North Korea issue, as it tries its best to balance such interests under difficult circumstances and create conditions for improving China-DPRK ties while preserving its mutual security and stability goals with Washington and Seoul.

By ignoring the Chinese, Kim Jong-un has been gambling with his regime’s future. The PRC appears more ready than ever before to abandon its troublesome friend. However, inertia—and a cold-hearted assessment of interests—is likely to hold Beijing back from cooperating with the U.S. if forced to choose America over Pyongyang.

No nuclear-weapon states have given up efforts in modernizing their arsenals, although for different reasons. A commitment of no-first-use is defensive in nature, but it doesn’t exclude nuclear retaliation. Such a pledge doesn’t cripple other countries’ nuclear capabilities: It boosts confidence that a world free of nuclear weapons is eventually possible.

China regards both the U.S. and Iran as important partners, which is why Beijing played a major role in putting together the Iran nuclear deal. Implementing that plan will face challenges in both the U.S. and Iran, and China’s commitment to building a new type of major-country relationship with the US means it will continue to assist both countries to keep the deal moving forward.

Obama will visit Hiroshima on May 27th when he attends the G7 summit held later this month in Japan. However, the visit may backfire and hurt Japan by touching off an inconvenient chain reaction. By fixating on the nuclear trauma while blotting out recollections of Japan’s victimization of others, Japan’s sense of its role as a victimizer has been weakened.

With the end of the nuclear security summits and major Russia-U.S. security tensions, China-U.S. nuclear security cooperation is needed more than ever. Fortunately, both governments are pursuing projects to counter nuclear smuggling, reduce the use of dangerous nuclear fuels, and augment other international institutions that counter nuclear terrorism.