The three countries must identify areas of cooperation in Myanmar, such as investment, public service projects among others, and foster a viable cooperation mechanism where interests are shared, risked are distributed. A non-competitive approach will contribute to the economic prosperity of Myanmar and the well-being of its people, and will meet the interests of the three countries and the region at large.

An EEZ claimed from the Spratly Islands as a unit could re-invigorate tensions between the two super-powers on the legality of military activities in the EEZ. China should carefully consider the long-term ramifications of a straight baseline declaration, not only in terms of its legality but also in terms of the impact it could have on an already volatile situation.

China’s advocacy of win-win cooperation marks the extension of its development philosophy to the rest of the world. Returning good for good and making concerted efforts to overcome difficulties are the spiritual mainstays of win-win cooperation and the soul of the new type of international relationship.

China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea and adjacent waters is a reasonable, legitimate historical fact that can’t be denied by any party, any means. It is utterly groundless to accuse China of violating international law, and the US-inspired tribunal merely increases tension to no purpose.

Though The Hague ruling pertains to the Philippines-China dispute, it will bolster similar claims by other states against China’s nine-dash line; it will increase pressure on China to seek a negotiated resolution to the overlapping claims; and it will circumscribe China’s SCS claims. In response, China must assure the ASEAN states of its benign intentions, dispelling impressions of hegemonic intentions.

After the South China Sea arbitration ruling, uncertainty and friction may increase in the region. However, the economic promise of China’s rise and the Asian century will only materialize with peace and stability in the region.

China has an overall strategic environment and strategic tasks that are much bigger than the South China Sea issue. China should proceed from the perspective of the strategic situation, make peace with neighboring countries, and finally persuade the US to accept China’s role in Asia. Governments of China’s neighbors may support one element in the Chinese government’s basic position on the South China Sea issue, but not necessarily all elements, and Beijing must balance its strategic priorities.

Enhancing ties with Beijing gives Russia some breathing room as the country is squeezed politically and economically because of its moves in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Doubts about Russia’s ability to pay back debts and good faith in pursuing such cooperation aside, there are benefits for China, too, in balancing US global power and influence.

The untimely passing of Ambassador Wu Jianmin is a reminder that President Xi’s mantra of “no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation” is worth repeating by more “doves” in both countries. The China-US relationship must be guided by more common sense, so that the “core interests” of both sides will not be undercut by “hawks” craving for war.

Taking advantage of the gap between the common-sense understanding shared by a small group of legal experts and the general public’s misunderstanding of international law, the U.S. is labeling China’s non-recognition of any award as non-compliance with international law. China must make the public — and scholars — appreciate the difference between general rules and exceptional rules.