Shen Dingli, Professor, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University
Nov 15, 2016
“Qualified” or not, the billionaire and reality TV star struck a chord with American voters, and his ideas on taxes, medical reform and other issues will evolve as the president-elect mends fences with his own party and develops his style of governance.
Shao Yuqun, Director, Institute for Taiwan, HK and Macau Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
Nov 14, 2016
It remains to be seen whether the Trump-led US will be more self-confident, or more suspicious; continue embracing (though no longer enthusiastically) globalization, or nervously shrink back. The notion that businessman Trump will be more interested in cutting deals, and that his foreign policy will forsake persistent American values and criteria, is overly naive.
Richard Javad Heydarian, Professorial Chairholder in Geopolitics, Polytechnic University of the Philippines
Nov 14, 2016
What we are witnessing isn’t necessarily a ‘Duterte wave’ of defections to China at the expense of America. More likely, it is a temporary recalibration on the part certain Southeast Asian states that are unsure of American commitment to the region and eager to avoid direct confrontation with China, which in turn is offering large-scale investment and trade deals in exchange for strategic acquiescence. China is offering lucrative packages of technical skills and soft loans for turbo-charged infrastructure projects. But, it remains to be seen how far this rebalancing will go, as other nations in the region shift away from China.
Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Nov 14, 2016
China has accepted some gains from the world order established by the United States, but they disapprove of how the structure reflects exclusively American values and is buttressed “by a military alignment, which does not take into consideration the security interests of others.” Some Chinese commentators can also see a great benefit to aligning with Russia to offset the U.S.; however, uncertainty about regional powers and IGO influence remains pivotal to the current great-power structure.
Jared McKinney, PhD student, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nov 11, 2016
Donald Trump will be the next president of the United States, which could signal a new configuration for U.S.-China relations. Three options appear possible. First, Trump’s Administration could end up confusing China through a mixture of respect and intimidation. Second, Trump’s Administration could opt to preserve the status quo of economic engagement but American military superiority in East Asia. And Third, Trump’s Administration could seek to orient the bilateral relationship towards respect and mutual benefit, avoiding “self-damaging” competition. Which path will be taken will largely rest on the sort of people Trump appoints to his Administration.
Daniel Bell, Chair Professor, Schwarzman Scholars program, Tsinghua University
Nov 11, 2016
Democracies aim to improve their democratic system while learning from the best of meritocratic practices, and meritocracies aim to improve their meritocratic system while learning from the best of democratic practices. There is no more talk about which system is superior: both political systems recognize each other as morally legitimate even though they are built on different foundations. The United States is the dominant power in the West, China in East Asia, but they strive to cooperate in areas of common concerns.
Sun Chenghao, Fellow, Center for International Security and Strategy of Tsinghua University; Munich Young Leader 2025
Nov 10, 2016
Reacting to issues from Korea to the South China Sea, the next president of the United States should carefully build mutual confidence and reduce the possibility of risks. Holding the annual summit between the two leaders as early as possible in 2017 would be a great first step.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor, Center for Policy Research
Nov 10, 2016
The organization BRICS faces challenges defining a mutual mission. Although these five emerging economies pride themselves on forming the first important non-Western global initiative with the aim to end the era of Atlantic dominance, the grouping is still searching to define a common identity and build institutionalized cooperation. Additionally, the Goa summit indeed was a reminder of China’s lengthening shadow over BRICS. China’s motives reflect a domineering power in the organization through its efforts to assert regional dominance, and the BRICS organization, coupled by a lack of common interest, struggles to establish legitimacy.
Robert I. Rotberg, Founding Director of Program on Intrastate Conflict, Harvard Kennedy School
Nov 10, 2016
The International Criminal Court faces an issue of legitimacy as the Nations of South Africa, Gambia, and Burundi announces their withdrawal from the institution. This move was endorsed by China, and came after allegations of the courts acting in Western interest. China should cut off its ties to Burundi and Gambia, minor players on the African and international chessboards of diplomacy, and chastise South Africa – not sanction their inexcusable errors. Additionally, the ICC is the only method of war crimes prosecution; so challenging it is potentially dangerous to the system of international law, the success of future cases, and the security of nations.
Yun Sun, Director of the China Program and Co-director of the East Asia Program, Stimson Center
Nov 09, 2016
Forty percent of China’s total ten vetoes ever casted at the UN Security Council have been on Syria, making it the most-vetoed issue of all time for China. The four vetoes and most recent abstention from the French-drafted resolution underscore China’s increasingly assertive stance on state sovereignty, territorial integrity and its repulsion to foreign interference.