For a mathematician, 2025 might stand out for being a “perfect square”: 45 multiplied by 45, a rare symmetry. But its significance goes far beyond numerical elegance – it marks the year the postwar global order expired, and a new one was about to be born.

“There’s no question about it,” US President Donald Trump said at this month’s FIFA World Cup Final Draw ceremony: The game that Americans call soccer “is football,” and the United States has to “come up with another name” for its National Football League (NFL).

The Trump administration has merged state authority with private interests, treating political power as a monetizable platform rather than a system of public governance. From Beijing’s perspective, this validates China’s pragmatic approach to legitimacy and positions the U.S. as a conglomerate of private interests rather than a traditional state.

Is the United States engaging in retrenchment or a new form of hegemony? Venezuela and Greenland are not separate stories but a single thread. A more transactional, more emotional and more coercion-oriented U.S. is taking shape.

The cases of Greenland, Venezuela and Ukraine signal what’s coming in the next phase of global governance. It is not disappearing but is being rebuilt—faster, more contested and more deal-driven than ever under the pressure of crisis and rivalry.

As the Philippines assume the ASEAN chairmanship in 2026, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is seeking to de-escalate tensions with China while deepening defense cooperation with the United States and other partners amid rising frictions in the South China Sea. The strategy reflects Manila’s effort to bolster deterrence without undermining ASEAN consensus or provoking broader regional instability.

The most important question stemming from America’s intervention in Venezuela is not whether it violated international law and norms, but what it reveals about the future of the liberal international order. Contrary to what some commentators say, that order is not collapsing, since its core pillars remain in place and the alternatives to them are still weak. But sustaining it will now involve more frequent discretionary US actions, and it will become increasingly unclear where the thresholds for future interventions lie.

When lawless behavior by powerful nations can be carried out with virtual impunity—with no significant international opposition—a civilized world order founded on rules rather than brute force can no longer be guaranteed.

The U.S. kidnapping of President Maduro represents one of the worst violations of international law by a major power in decades. It also reflects the role of Venezuela as a battleground of U.S. and Chinese interests.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to China reinforced bilateral ties through trade, investment, and scientific cooperation, yet yielded few breakthroughs on contentious issues like Ukraine or advanced technology transfer, reflecting Beijing’s guarded approach. While Macron projects a Neo-Gaullist vision of strategic autonomy and a “Third Way” between the U.S. and China, structural constraints in France and the enduring weight of trans-Atlantic ties limit the substantive impact of his approach.