The abusive use of alliances in the region will only hurt. Judging from history and current reality, peace will not flower with a China of 1.4 billion people trapped in stagnation, nor will it help to foster hostile interactions with its neighbors.

In the midst of the Cold War, US policymakers became convinced that détente with China would best serve America’s strategic interests. It was only made possible after the question of Taiwan was handled with diplomatic dexterity. The magic formulation clinched after painstaking negotiation was US acknowledgement of the Chinese position that “there is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China”.

When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his invasion of Ukraine on February 24, he envisaged a quick seizure of Kyiv and a change of government analogous to Soviet interventions in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968. But it wasn’t to be. The war is still raging, and no one knows when or how it will end.

In recent years, Sino-Russian relations have become a model of great power relations with high degree of mutual trust, high level of collaboration and high strategic value. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the assessment of the challenges for China-Russia relations in the external environment, the understanding of the conflict’s role in reshaping China-Russia relations, and the examination of the prospects of China-Russia relations have been critical in the analysis of how the Russia-Ukraine conflict will impact the game of great powers.

Up till now, the fighting has been going on for over 100 days, with the two warring sides still in an offensive and defensive stalemate. Questions about this ongoing crisis can be listed in a long line, most of which no one can answer at this time. Yet among all the uncertainties, one thing is certain: what the Russian troops crossed on February 24 was not simply the land border between Russia and Ukraine, but rather more symbolically, the River Rubicon of the post-cold war international order.

At first glance, the Ukraine conflict has some loose parallels to 1958, when the People’s Liberation Army shelled Kinmen without notifying Russia in advance. But while rumors of intrigue may raise eyebrows, the comparison falls apart quickly.

America wants to back away some, but not entirely, as the region has become an important geopolitical factor. So U.S engagement will be limited. With Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific in play, it cannot afford to add resources to the Arab region.

There was nothing new revealed in the U.S. president’s visit, other than launching Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Roping in Japan and South Korea and declaring that the U.S. would “intervene” in a Taiwan conflict, all amounted to old news.

Lacking concrete detail, the framework is burdened by great uncertainty. Moreover, the United States seems to be sending a decoupling signal to China — a questionable strategy. If the U.S. continues along this line, it will be hard to win confidence and cooperation from countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

Besides tackling COVID-19 and climate change, a unifying force within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is undoubtedly the member countries’ response to China. As the May Quad summit is underway, analysts must assess both how the Quad will react to China as well as how China will respond to the Quad alliance.