With Donald Trump making another run for the White House and the possible disruptions his election could bring, it is sensible for Germany to enhance win-win cooperation with China and push for the strategic enhancement of China-EU relations.

The youth will be crucial for President Joe Biden’s bid for re-election, as it was in 2020. But Biden’s continued support for Israel is cooling their ardor. To make matters worse, support for Biden among Muslim-Americans — a key voting bloc in some swing states — has taken a nosedive.

Talking, even through hard times, is not only necessary but also meaningful, because the audience is wider than just the two participants. People are listening at the bilateral, regional and global levels.

A victory by Donald Trump is an ugly prospect that most of the world shudders to contemplate. We’re not betting he’ll win in 2024 but are simply acknowledging that it’s possible and that instability is likely to follow. China cannot afford to wait until the last minute before taking action.

The United States doesn’t hesitate to pressure countries and international organizations to side with it and to isolate Russia. However, it has been unable to persuade China to follow suit. Here’s why.

Washington’s strategic misunderstanding of China is a crucial reason, if not the primary one, behind the troubles in China-U.S. relations. Social changes and other factors have long affected Washington’s perceptions of China, and many of these arise from chronic issues in U.S. politics. Currently, at least five factors are at play.

The U.S. view of competition with China seems to boil down to different notions of what makes a good system of governance. In truth, however, the competition turns on fundamental national interests. By emphasizing ideology, the United States masks its pursuit of immediate interests and long-term dominance.

The United States has intensified its efforts to assert or reclaim American Primacy in Asia. Assert if one holds the view that it still holds military preponderance; reclaim if one believes that it doesn’t. Through a series of so-called mini-lateral arrangements, the US has in recent years sought to enlist its Asia Pacific client states, former colonies and subimperial allies to anchor a 21st Century bulwark on the western edge of America’s Lake. The Quad, AUKUS and now the trilateral involving Japan and the Philippines form part of a lattice-like network, in all practical intents and purposes, aimed squarely at the containment of China.

America is holding ASEAN countries back from a central role in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, but their self-confidence is growing. It’s not lost on anyone that Southeast Asia’s strategic position has not changed in the minds of U.S. decision-makers. Meanwhile, China offers welcome alternatives.

A floor needs to be established for bilateral interactions so that breakdowns can be avoided. In the post-Kissinger era, new interlocutors between Beijing and Washington are also needed — people who understand both countries and who can present creative ideas through safe channels.