In an era marked by trust deficits at the national level, individual businesses have emerged as key vehicles for pragmatic coexistence. Their fundamental rationality may make them, under certain conditions, the only entities capable of maintaining equilibrium.

High import duties on Chinese goods have become the new normal for the United States. While there’s lots of talk about renewed stability with China after the presidents met in South Korea, but the world’s two largest economies appear to be learning how to live apart.

In the geopolitical theater of 2025, the United States’ trade posture toward China exemplifies a pattern of escalating threats that yield diminishing strategic returns.

The first in-person meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi in six years focused almost exclusively on trade and technology, resulting in a temporary rollback of tariffs and export restrictions but producing no new agreements or progress on broader security or geopolitical issues. The meeting largely served to stabilize U.S.-China relations and decrease tensions, with both leaders agreeing to reciprocal visits in 2026 for further discussions, effectively “kicking the can down the road” on deeper bilateral challenges.

John Maynard Keynes’ The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919) remains one of the most prescient critiques of postwar settlement in modern history. In it, Keynes warned that victory can hollow itself out when the victors lose their sense of humility. The punitive reparations imposed upon Germany after World War I, he argued, sowed the seeds for future instability by humiliating and impoverishing a nation that, once stripped of dignity and hope, would not long consent to the order imposed upon it. His insight was both economic as well as moral and political: sustainable peace requires magnanimity, not vengeance; it presupposes an architecture of inclusion, not one of exclusion. In today’s parlance, it rejects blocs aimed at those outside and seeks to ground relations in the idea of indivisible peace.

After months of escalating tariffs and retaliatory measures, China and the United States have reached a fragile truce that has begun to stabilize their trade and technology relationship. While tensions over chips, rare earths, and agricultural exports persist, both sides now recognize their mutual vulnerability, creating a cautious but potentially durable détente rooted in economic deterrence rather than dominance.

China’s decision to forgo special rights in the WTO shows that it takes its great power responsibility seriously. It wants to advance trade cooperation with developed economies and with Global South. A trade upturn with the United States in 2026 is much anticipated.

Whether the dream is making America great again or the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, the aspirations of the two countries’ respective peoples for a better life should drive every decision. Neither people will succeed without a sound external environment. Slogans are not enough.

Since the U.S.-China trade war began in April, Chinese companies have faced high tariffs and economic uncertainty, prompting them to reshore production to the U.S., shift manufacturing to developing countries, and diversify into other markets. Despite higher costs and regulatory challenges, they are balancing supply chain stability with expansion in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Europe to maintain their low-cost business models.

Trump’s ‘America First’ protectionist tactics are supposed to create advantages for the U.S. in trade and freeze out China in theory, but expect that the world needs America’s consumers to continue. New connections forming amid the trade war could mean instead, the U.S. is left out in the cold.