Trump’s Oval Office ambush of Ukrainian President Zelensky highlights the unpredictability and volatility of U.S. diplomacy under his second term—an unsettling prospect for China as it prepares for a potential Trump-Xi summit. With Trump emboldened and increasingly unpredictable, China may face new challenges in navigating an engagement with a leader who thrives on disruption.

Peter Hegseth’s inability to name an ASEAN country underscores the Trump administration’s broader indifference to Southeast Asia, favoring trade protectionism, military burden-shifting, and transactional diplomacy over sustained regional engagement.

The Asia-Pacific region began to exhibit signs of easing major geopolitical tensions in late 2024, but has started to heat up again following President Trump’s return to power in the White House. During the ‘easing’ period, although low-level disputes persisted in the vast region, in the South China Sea, and in cross-strait relations, the risk of a conflict involving regional heavyweights was not imminent.

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth urged NATO to take greater responsibility for European security as the U.S. shifts focus to deterring China. The Trump administration’s reassessment of global deployments could foreshadow a strategic pivot, but uncertainties remain over China’s military trajectory and the effectiveness of U.S. policy responses.

Simon Lacey, Head of Digital Trade and Geopolitics at the World Economic Forum, in a recent interview with Marc Smrikarov of China-US Focus, discusses areas where U.S. and Chinese interests align, such as global financial stability and freedom of navigation. Additionally, he emphasizes the need for patience and understanding on both sides, and to recognize the importance of cooperation in a shifting multipolar world. He also highlights the fragmentation of AI development between the U.S. and China, warning that the lack of cross-collaboration could hinder innovation, and urges a more rational approach to labeling AI and semiconductors as dual-use technologies in national security contexts.

U.S. allies in the long run are expected to pursue greater strategic autonomy, which means defining their national interests outside of American influence. Their policies toward China are therefore likely to continue evolving in a pragmatic and nuanced direction.

The grand strategies of Sun Tzu and Thucydides converge on a central idea: true victory lies in avoiding direct confrontation. In an era of nuclear deterrence and global challenges, their wisdom underscores that great powers must prioritize strategic restraint, internal resilience, and measured competition over reckless escalation.

Given the deadly and complex nature of the U.S. fentanyl crisis, overcoming challenges and making the best of cooperation have become daunting tasks. The United States needs to act to stem domestic demand instead of accusing China of complicity.

Despite their differences, both China and the United States benefit from constructive connections and suffer from continued antagonism. The next few years will determine whether relations will develop into a new cold war or move toward a more equitable form of coexistence.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently stated that multipolarity is not only the preference, but the norm in the Trump administration—a dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy. But unlike China’s globally engaged model, Rubio’s approach prioritizes U.S. interests, reflecting a more transactional and less globally engaged stance.