The summit could mark a turning point in U.S.-Russia relations and lead to a rewriting of the geopolitical playbook. For China, the lesson is that it must hold fast to its principles, maintain strategic composure and pursue its interests on its own terms.

U.S. policy in Latin America has acquired some new characteristics. While it retains the basic shape of the centuries-old Monroe Doctrine, it has now been enhanced with Donald Trump’s peculiar transactional and bullying style.

The second Trump administration has combined aggressive diplomatic engagement with a confrontational trade policy that alienates allies and risks triggering a global recession, despite legitimate concerns about America’s industrial decline. While Trump's trade agenda aims to restructure global commerce to favor U.S. interests, its unilateral execution and failure to build a coalition undermine its effectiveness and may isolate the U.S. rather than restore its manufacturing strength.

The second Trump administration’s trade policies and assertive defense diplomacy have unsettled key Asian allies, straining some relationships while drawing others into deeper military cooperation. This approach has raised concerns about diminishing strategic autonomy among U.S. partners and the potential for pushing them closer to China.

In the post-World War II period, the US maintained nearly uncontested supremacy over the vast Asia-Pacific region. Under the San Francisco System, or the ‘Hub and Spokes’ architecture, the US established military alliances, provided economic assistance, and proactively engaged with the region. The strategic foundation of US policy relied on both bilateral and multilateral defense agreements, such as those with Japan (1951), South Korea (1953), the Philippines (1951), Australia, New Zealand (collectively known as ANZUS, 1951), and Thailand (1954).

Over the past 50 years since diplomatic relations were established between China and the European Union, differences have never become insurmountable obstacles. This is the proven pattern and the one to which they should continue to adhere in the future.

The results of the election in Japan’s House of Councillors highlight a key trend: An era of political fragmentation in Japanese party politics has arrived, and populist political forces are growing.

At the 25th China-EU Summit in Beijing, Chinese and European leaders acknowledged both overlapping interests and deep divergences, especially over China’s seeming alignment with Russia and the Ukraine war. While Beijing seeks improved economic ties with Europe, it continues to prioritize geopolitical security and its strategic rivalry with the U.S. over European concerns, limiting the prospects for major diplomatic improvements.

In times of geopolitical uncertainty, regional unity is the surest path forward. In July, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) released its updated outlook for the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, plus China, Japan, and South Korea. AMRO revised down its growth forecasts for 2025 and 2026 to 3.8% and 3.6%, respectively, and highlighted the urgent need for greater regional integration.

In his meetings with US President Donald Trump in Washington this week, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., is navigating a challenging new reality: a place under America’s security umbrella no longer comes with a discount at the customs window. When it comes to trade, Trump throws allies and adversaries into the same basket. But Marcos thinks he can negotiate an agreement that preserves and even strengthens the US-Philippines trade relationship.