The U.S. operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro demonstrates Washington’s military power and intent to counter rival influence, particularly China, in the Western Hemisphere, but it violates international law and risks destabilizing the region. Such interventions often produce unintended consequences, embolden other powers to challenge norms, and expose smaller states to coercion, highlighting the dangers of unilateral actions under the guise of national or hemispheric security.

America’s actions in Venezuela lay bare the lengths Trump’s administration will go to uphold American hegemony in the Western hemisphere. The rest of the world now must operate around the real potential of American military intervention until further notice.

South Korea has recently proven atypically successful in straddling regional tensions involving China, but Beijing’s strained relations with Washington and its allies will sorely test Seoul’s pragmatic diplomacy in 2026.

For a mathematician, 2025 might stand out for being a “perfect square”: 45 multiplied by 45, a rare symmetry. But its significance goes far beyond numerical elegance – it marks the year the postwar global order expired, and a new one was about to be born.

“There’s no question about it,” US President Donald Trump said at this month’s FIFA World Cup Final Draw ceremony: The game that Americans call soccer “is football,” and the United States has to “come up with another name” for its National Football League (NFL).

The Trump administration has merged state authority with private interests, treating political power as a monetizable platform rather than a system of public governance. From Beijing’s perspective, this validates China’s pragmatic approach to legitimacy and positions the U.S. as a conglomerate of private interests rather than a traditional state.

Is the United States engaging in retrenchment or a new form of hegemony? Venezuela and Greenland are not separate stories but a single thread. A more transactional, more emotional and more coercion-oriented U.S. is taking shape.

The cases of Greenland, Venezuela and Ukraine signal what’s coming in the next phase of global governance. It is not disappearing but is being rebuilt—faster, more contested and more deal-driven than ever under the pressure of crisis and rivalry.

As the Philippines assume the ASEAN chairmanship in 2026, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is seeking to de-escalate tensions with China while deepening defense cooperation with the United States and other partners amid rising frictions in the South China Sea. The strategy reflects Manila’s effort to bolster deterrence without undermining ASEAN consensus or provoking broader regional instability.

The most important question stemming from America’s intervention in Venezuela is not whether it violated international law and norms, but what it reveals about the future of the liberal international order. Contrary to what some commentators say, that order is not collapsing, since its core pillars remain in place and the alternatives to them are still weak. But sustaining it will now involve more frequent discretionary US actions, and it will become increasingly unclear where the thresholds for future interventions lie.