Despite China’s struggle to identify new drivers of growth, there are many positive indicators in the economy right now. We should be more result-focused and open-minded about China’s economic pursuit, and be willing to see the positive side while weighing the country’s economic future.

With economic interdependence in the era of globalization, and determination by both sides to avoid the Thucydides Trap, it is debatable that the rising power will slide into an inevitable conflict with the established power. But China’s struggle to shift from a labor-intensive economy to one driven by technology and knowledge may make other “traps” irrelevant.

Trump’s election campaign promises and and the executive orders the new president signed after he came into the White House reveal a narrow-minded, conservative and selfish United States. It’s a startling reversal of the country’s outlook for six decades, and completely outdated.

It has been four years since One Belt, One Road (OBOR) was first announced, but the prospects of OBOR’s impact on Central Asia remain unclear, while the commitment of Beijing to invest $40 billion into Central Asia’s poor and deteriorating infrastructure have not materialized.The diversity of views on OBOR demonstrate that OBOR is far from being a complete product. It is an evolving concept, which is yet to be finalized. Accordingly, in the context of Central Asia, it remains unclear what form OBOR will take. Is OBOR a qualitatively new endeavour to be implemented in the region? Or, is it simply a rebranded form of Chinese pre-existing infrastructure projects, unified under the aegis of the Silk Road discourses?

Why has there been such a tidal change in the U.S.-Russia-China strategic triangle? The reason is simple: the United States and China are deeply enmeshed over a broad spectrum of politico-economic relations. Russia, on the other hand, is a straight forward strategic competitor and, within the international economic order, by and large a natural resource exporter.

2017 will likely be one of the most challenging years in decades for US companies in China.

The trade deficit is driven by U.S. government policies that influence domestic savings and investment, not by the policies of governments overseas. Unfortunately, the executive order seems premised on the mistaken notion that fixing trade-distorting policies of other countries would reduce the U.S. trade deficit.

The performance of Chinese and U.S. shares are rarely compared side-by-side. Together though, they tell the story of the gains that have been available to investors over the past decades, in what are now regarded as the two largest economies—and most capitalised stock markets—in the world.

All the efforts Chicago has made to woo Chinese corporations, along with the resulting economic, cultural, and academic benefits both sides have enjoyed, might be curbed by growing inward-looking policies.

Despite preliminary pessimism, the Trump-Xi Summit showed greater trade pragmatism than initially expected, even though it was overshadowed by a raw display of U.S. military power.