Whether assessing the prospects of the war in Ukraine or predicting the trajectory of relations between the United States and Russia, U.S. policy discussions have generally revealed a cautious, realistic tone: The war is unlikely to end quickly, and the rupture in the international order is widening.

Germany’s renewed engagement with China reflects deep shifts in the international system. As alliance cohesion weakens and multipolar trends advances, Berlin is exploring interest-based cooperation beyond traditional Western frameworks, signaling a broader transition from ideology-driven alliances toward pragmatic international partnerships.

Growing instability in the global order and rising uncertainty in relations with major powers are driving countries such as India, Canada, Brazil, and European states to deepen cooperation with one another. These middle powers are increasingly pursuing strategic partnerships, trade agreements, and supply-chain coordination to preserve autonomy and stability amid great-power rivalry.

Reaffirming legal limits is not an act of idealism. It is one of prudence. Strategic stability is not self-sustaining. It must be actively maintained. And in the nuclear age, maintenance begins not only with capability but with responsibility.

The durability of any China-UK rapprochement will depend not on diplomatic symbolism but on whether London is prepared to pursue pragmatic cooperation based on its own national interests.

By threatening to seize Greenland by force, US President Donald Trump has exposed the childlike illusions of his European admirers. Having spent years cultivating their bromances with him, the continent’s right-wing populists – the United Kingdom’s Nigel Farage, Jordan Bardella in France, Alice Weidel in Germany, Italy’s Matteo Salvini, Robert Fico in Slovakia, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, and Mateusz Morawiecki in Poland – imagined themselves fellow travelers in a revolt against liberal internationalism. Now their idol and patron has been threatening to swallow whole or in part (if the supposed “deal” he has announced comes about) the sovereign territory of a European ally.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to China reinforced bilateral ties through trade, investment, and scientific cooperation, yet yielded few breakthroughs on contentious issues like Ukraine or advanced technology transfer, reflecting Beijing’s guarded approach. While Macron projects a Neo-Gaullist vision of strategic autonomy and a “Third Way” between the U.S. and China, structural constraints in France and the enduring weight of trans-Atlantic ties limit the substantive impact of his approach.

In the near future, the supposed “multipolar” world has been deferred, giving way instead to “orbital bipolarity”—a system in which global politics and industry are pulled into competing gravitational fields centered on the United States and China. Multilateralism has become inert, and every other power now orbits these two anchors while maintaining the fiction of choice and autonomy.

Europe’s dissatisfaction, anxiety and dependence will continue to shape the next stage of transatlantic relations. The rift may not lead to a break. But it will likely lead to a relationship that becomes ever more transactional, more realist and ultimately more fragile.

By sacrificing Chinese interests to signal alignment with the United States, the European Union overestimates its own leverage and underestimates China’s resilience and strategic resolve, thereby complicating pragmatic China-EU cooperation and impeding coordination on global challenges.