Middle powers on the continent have a real motivation to cooperate. Constrained by structural factors such as their defense systems, however, the so-called transatlantic shared heritage and the scale of the U.S. market, their cooperation is seen mostly in policy coordination and diplomatic statements.

Even as the United States attempts to nudge its allies toward taking a tougher line on China, Washington is increasingly seen as an unreliable partner. Its pressure no longer brings automatic alignment. Other Western nations are choosing their own course.

Whether assessing the prospects of the war in Ukraine or predicting the trajectory of relations between the United States and Russia, U.S. policy discussions have generally revealed a cautious, realistic tone: The war is unlikely to end quickly, and the rupture in the international order is widening.

Germany’s renewed engagement with China reflects deep shifts in the international system. As alliance cohesion weakens and multipolar trends advances, Berlin is exploring interest-based cooperation beyond traditional Western frameworks, signaling a broader transition from ideology-driven alliances toward pragmatic international partnerships.

Growing instability in the global order and rising uncertainty in relations with major powers are driving countries such as India, Canada, Brazil, and European states to deepen cooperation with one another. These middle powers are increasingly pursuing strategic partnerships, trade agreements, and supply-chain coordination to preserve autonomy and stability amid great-power rivalry.

Reaffirming legal limits is not an act of idealism. It is one of prudence. Strategic stability is not self-sustaining. It must be actively maintained. And in the nuclear age, maintenance begins not only with capability but with responsibility.

The durability of any China-UK rapprochement will depend not on diplomatic symbolism but on whether London is prepared to pursue pragmatic cooperation based on its own national interests.

By threatening to seize Greenland by force, US President Donald Trump has exposed the childlike illusions of his European admirers. Having spent years cultivating their bromances with him, the continent’s right-wing populists – the United Kingdom’s Nigel Farage, Jordan Bardella in France, Alice Weidel in Germany, Italy’s Matteo Salvini, Robert Fico in Slovakia, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, and Mateusz Morawiecki in Poland – imagined themselves fellow travelers in a revolt against liberal internationalism. Now their idol and patron has been threatening to swallow whole or in part (if the supposed “deal” he has announced comes about) the sovereign territory of a European ally.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to China reinforced bilateral ties through trade, investment, and scientific cooperation, yet yielded few breakthroughs on contentious issues like Ukraine or advanced technology transfer, reflecting Beijing’s guarded approach. While Macron projects a Neo-Gaullist vision of strategic autonomy and a “Third Way” between the U.S. and China, structural constraints in France and the enduring weight of trans-Atlantic ties limit the substantive impact of his approach.

In the near future, the supposed “multipolar” world has been deferred, giving way instead to “orbital bipolarity”—a system in which global politics and industry are pulled into competing gravitational fields centered on the United States and China. Multilateralism has become inert, and every other power now orbits these two anchors while maintaining the fiction of choice and autonomy.