A series of policies in the U.S. has made life much more difficult for China concepts stock companies. CCS listings in the U.S. are emerging as the next big risk, and the adoption of the variable interest entity structure, or VIE, is storing up trouble.

As US President Joe Biden’s administration implements its strategy of great power competition with China, analysts seek historical metaphors to explain the deepening rivalry. But while many invoke the onset of the Cold War, a more worrisome historical metaphor is the start of World War I. In 1914, all the great powers expected a short third Balkan War. Instead, as the British historian Christopher Clark has shown, they sleepwalked into a conflagration that lasted four years, destroyed four empires, and killed millions.

Maintaining strategic security and its stature as a major global power are the country’s priorities. While its economy is relatively weak, Russia’s military power, its experience and its influence in global affairs means that it will continue to be an important player in shaping the international landscape.

Washington’s current Afghanistan crisis and domestic political instability present an ideal opportunity for China to accelerate its global and regional ‘grand strategy.’ Is the United States prepared to slow its advance?

Conventional logic would say that new leadership should open a broad window to reset relationships between nations. Yet as the first 6 months of the Biden presidency shows, the story is not always so cut-and-dry.

In the year 2034, the United States and China become embroiled in a series of military conflicts that escalate into a devastating tactical nuclear war. Other countries – including Russia, Iran, and India – get involved. Suddenly, the world is on the verge of World War III.

For the United States, the Nord Stream 2 gas project is a reminder of its waning global hegemony. Its ability to control its allies has declined. Bilateral relations have deteriorated. Attempts to block construction have failed. America has become a shadow of its former self.

China and United States should distinguish between strategic competition and a struggle for supremacy, as doing so would help avoid stepping over a boundary line beyond which competition turns into a drive for hegemony and world domination.

During the four decades of the Cold War, the United States had a grand strategy focused on containing the power of the Soviet Union. Yet by the 1990s, following the Soviet Union’s collapse, America had been deprived of that pole star. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, US President George W. Bush’s administration tried to fill the void with a strategy that it called a “global war on terror.” But that approach provided nebulous guidance and led to long US-led wars in marginal places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 2017, the US has returned to “great-power competition,” this time with China.

U.S. Deputy of State Wendy Sherman recently talked with Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng and Foreign Minister and State Councilor Wang Yi on her visit to China. As relations remain contentious, it’s important that both China and the U.S. keep communication channels plural, open, and as bilaterally reciprocated as possible.