The U.S.-Iran conflict and Trump’s tendency to weaponize the dollar are hastening attempts by China to de-dollarize oil and gas markets, boosting the use of the ‘petro-yuan’, while pushing the EU to resurrect plans to strengthen the euro on the global stage. A tripolar monetary order is emerging, in which the dollar would be ‘first among equals’ and the renminbi, and the euro, would have their rightful place, commensurate with their importance in the global economy.

Changing demographics relating to the economy have raised righteous concerns in stories about China, Japan, even the United States. Europe hasn’t come under the same scrutiny, but a closer look reveals adjacent hurdles coming in the next decade. Europe seems unprepared for these changes and remains focused on restoring its former global standing rather than adapting to a new reality in which other powers continue to pull ahead.

Chinese firms have achieved global leadership in industries once assumed to be the preserve of advanced economies: electric vehicles, batteries, industrial robots, solar panels, and AI—to name just a few. The standard explanation for this success is that the Chinese state subsidizes production, an argument that has now been given the institutional weight of a major OECD report.

Competition in artificial intelligence is a contest across the entire industrial value chain. Only by advancing open innovation, ensuring security and trust, promoting inclusive development and strengthening global governance can AI contribute to shared global prosperity.

China's latest push to internationalize the renminbi is driven less by ambitions to challenge the U.S. dollar's global dominance than by efforts to build a more resilient financial system that reduces dependence on Western-led financial infrastructure and strengthens China's strategic autonomy amid growing geopolitical competition.

The current USMCA review is expected to introduce new China-related restrictive provisions across four key areas: labor enforcement, rules of origin, economic security coordination and external tariff alignment. Taken together, these measures would substantially narrow market access for Chinese capital, goods and technology in North America.

The 2026 oil crisis revealed a transformed China: no longer just the world's largest oil importer and refiner, but a state actor deploying stockpiles, export controls, and strategic opacity to shape global energy markets on its own terms.

In the long sweep of history, China’s economic performance over the past 50 years will obviously stand out for the sheer scale and pace of quality-of-life improvements within that country. But China’s impact on the rest of the world has still been underappreciated.

China’s well-documented rise in prominence in the global supply chain has created an economic engine that now rivals the United States, but now facing stagnating growth, can China innovate into the 21st Century and drive into new territory?

China’s membership is not a threat. Rather, it is a sustainable framework for the United States to prosper. Both sides could well complement each other and grow together, benefiting our people and the world over.