By ignoring the Chinese, Kim Jong-un has been gambling with his regime’s future. The PRC appears more ready than ever before to abandon its troublesome friend. However, inertia—and a cold-hearted assessment of interests—is likely to hold Beijing back from cooperating with the U.S. if forced to choose America over Pyongyang.

The Philippines is being used by the US merely as a pawn to serve the strategic interests of the US. It is precisely because we have seen through this that we choose to resist the South China Sea arbitration -- a political farce under the cloak of law -- and reject any award that comes out of the arbitration.

Both the U.S. and China must bear responsibility for the ratcheting up of tension in the SCS and East China Sea. Washington clings to “freedom of navigation” as its principal reason for challenging Chinese claims even though unencumbered passage has not denied U.S. or any other country’s ships. Beijing should be consistent in recognizing that a legitimate dispute exists, just as it demands that Japan acknowledge a sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands.

On 10 June 2016, the Chinese Society of International Law (CSIL) released a paper entitled The Tribunal’s Award in the “South China Sea Arbitration” Initiated by the Philippines Is Null and Void.

The Philippines has brought arbitration proceedings against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) relating to the South China Sea, and the Tribunal has recently given its decision on whether it has jurisdiction over the claims made by the Philippines.

: Franz-Stefan Gady argues that the end goal of Sino-U.S. deliberations will not be an end to state-sponsored hacking or cyber espionage, but to put a framework in place that will not only help prevent disagreements in cyberspace from spilling over into other parts of the bilateral relationship, but also help both sides to get closer to an understanding of what constitutes strategic stability, i.e., peace, in cyberspace.

China has been consulting and cooperating with ASEAN nations on the South China Sea issue following the “dual track” approach under corresponding regional and bilateral legal frameworks. The US, by maintaining a lonely existence beyond the international maritime legal order, will eventually isolate itself by attempting to isolate China.

No nuclear-weapon states have given up efforts in modernizing their arsenals, although for different reasons. A commitment of no-first-use is defensive in nature, but it doesn’t exclude nuclear retaliation. Such a pledge doesn’t cripple other countries’ nuclear capabilities: It boosts confidence that a world free of nuclear weapons is eventually possible.

Norms, or generally accepted modes of behaviour, have provided a quicker and more flexible approach than international law for governing actions in cyberspace. While both China and the United States have begun discussing such behaviour in terms of international law, it currently seems unlikely that an agreement, or even trust, will be reached in the near future.

Although a rules-based and law-based approach in the international arena is an admirable aspiration, law will not solve the dangerous problems in the South China Sea. More specifically, the upcoming ruling in the case brought by the Philippines against China before an arbitration tribunal under the U.N. Convention the Law of the Seas will not solve the problems or even make a major headway in resolving them. An examination of the issues before the tribunal and its most likely decisions demonstrate that the tribunal and law can make only a very limited contribution to resolving the South China Sea crisis. Law will not save us from continuing to focus predominantly on negotiations and power politics.