Particularly after the election of the progressive Moon Jae-in as president of South Korea, it is opportune to consider whether American policy toward the North is due for a radical rethinking.

Maritime trade accounts for 90% of world trade, therefore international “choke points” like the Strait of Malacca are critically important for China, the largest trading nation in the world. The PLA Navy harbors no ambitions to control these straits, but it doesn’t want the straits to be controlled by others, either. The psychological effect of a Chinese carrier offshore would help “to subdue the enemy without using force”.

Two major security concerns, a rising China and a nuclear North Korea, have prompted the Pentagon to endorse a plan to invest $7.5 billion to strengthen the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region over the next five years. However, it remains to be seen how this fits with Trump administration’s broader policy and military posture for the Asia Pacific.

Even after the city’s anticipated retaking, jihadist ideas advocated by ISIS carry certain ideological appeal, which will not go away because of the group’s military defeat in the region or the deaths of its leaders. The chaotic environments of Iraq and Syria offer a rich seedbed for continued instability, recruiting and violence.

Affirmative findings would give the president statutory authority to raise import barriers to protect domestic sources. But invoking national security to justify protectionism is an extreme measure—the “nuclear option” of international trade law—that would generate some undesirable consequences for U.S.-China relations, as well as for the rules-based trading system itself.

The nature of Washington’s alliance network was always based on the assumption that the United States was firmly in charge of policy decisions. The risk inherent to America’s allies from that arrangement is now becoming increasingly evident.

Currently, there is no sufficient distinction in international law or norms to be made between simple system breaches and more malicious actions that damage or destroy systems, and that will almost certainly become necessary for the United States and China alike.

If the past is any predictor of the future, then whatever capabilities the U.S. develops, other countries will as well. This has reinvigorated the current security dilemma that has long plagued space strategy based on technology defending technology, particularly in the case of the U.S. and China. It is in every country’s interest to pursue ways to enhance communication and clarify expectations of responsible actors in space with as much vigor as they do contingency warfighting plans and the development of new warfighting technologies. That, unfortunately, has not been the case, even though the last two years have seen more progress in diplomatic space efforts through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space than any other time prior.

A salience-based bargain considers the salience each country considers as its core interest. When applied to China-U.S. relations, it could be helpful in making concessions on both sides in order to come to an agreement on dealing with North Korea.

Both the Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army have a special interest in the PRC’s relationship with the North. But presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump seem to understand each other on the Korean Peninsula issue, and there may be no better opportunity for the U.S. and Chinese governments to come to an understanding.