Economic cooperation and trade frictions will probably simultaneously increase as the new American government’s “buy American and hire American” focus as it seeks greater economic benefits with its trading partners. But there are many areas where the interests of China and the US converge, which the leaders of both countries clearly appreciate.

While there are some variables in Trump diplomacy, variables do not necessarily equal uncertainties. Many of the forces affecting US diplomacy and global interactions are constant and predictable.

Despite superficial appearances and some genuine outreach between Trump and Putin, the differences between these rival countries are too complex, too deep and too historic to quickly wash away, even if such a move was in American interests.

Major powers need to work together to push globalization forward in the right direction, with more equitable benefits for people in every country. Any action to gain geopolitical advantage at the expense of another major power will not only bring risks to global security but damage prospects for world economic growth.

It is becoming increasingly clear that over the course of the next four years, the Trump Administration is going to conduct an all-out campaign to undermine the Great-Power norms that have so far enabled peace between the U.S. and China. The result is likely to be not just instability, but a journey down the road to war.

Conflict often results during power transitions. The U.S. should learn from Great Britain’s policy toward the rabidly nationalistic rising giant on the North American continent. After fighting two wars with its one-time colonists, Britain wisely chose peace.

China has accepted some gains from the world order established by the United States, but they disapprove of how the structure reflects exclusively American values and is buttressed “by a military alignment, which does not take into consideration the security interests of others.” Some Chinese commentators can also see a great benefit to aligning with Russia to offset the U.S.; however, uncertainty about regional powers and IGO influence remains pivotal to the current great-power structure.

The U.S. has long used dialogue to prod China to act in a manner supportive of global norms and institutions. In 2005, then Undersecretary of State Robert Zoellick gave a speech where he called on China to start acting as a responsible stakeholder of the global governance regime. Some eleven years later, the lectured became the lecturer. Rather than the U.S. lecturing China, China is calling on the U.S. to act responsibly in relation to global trade and climate norms.

The US has shown no desire to defend the arbitration award with force as hinted by the exercise in the Philippine Sea. Although the American strategic community now sees markedly greater risks of military conflict with China, US decision-makers also don’t believe that the US has the ability to change or stop China’s international conduct by force.