Garnering much less attention from the ASEAN summit was the single paragraph that “noted Timor-Leste’s application for ASEAN membership and looked forward to the continued discussion” about reports and capacity building regarding that small Southeast Asian island nation’s longstanding efforts to join the regional bloc. This newest of Asian nations – having regained independence from Indonesia in 2002 – deserves ASEAN, U.S. and Chinese investment and support for its efforts to further integrate and engage with the wider region.

Although the signing of the framework of the Code of Conduct is only a small step forward, it’s actually of great significance for China-ASEAN relations.

Crucially, the ASEAN meeting underscored the “importance of non-militarization and self-restraint” for both claimant states as well as “all other states.” The ASEAN communiqué effectively echoed China’s line, since Beijing has opposed the Philippines’ arbitration award, shunned a “legally binding” COC, underplayed its reclamation activities in disputed waters, and called upon external powers such as the U.S. to stay out of the conflict.

ASEAN meetings almost always generate expectations of raising the South China Sea (SCS) disputes to the point where the success of the meeting boils down to how tough the adopted language is in the final official statements. Considering the breadth and depth of issues covered by ASEAN in its annual meetings, such reduction is unfortunate and unfair.

The United States has revamped its maritime response to Chinese policy in the South China Sea, conducting its first Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) since President Trump took office. While China cannot allow this action to go unchecked, it should consider its larger global and regional power objectives before determining its response.

China claims sovereignty over almost the entirety of the South China Sea, while consistently rejecting The Hague ruling. Thus, the only way for a JDA to push through is if Duterte managed to amend the Philippine constitution, largely ignore his country’s arbitration award victory, and overcome deep-seated public antipathy towards resource-sharing agreements with China. This will be an uphill battle with a lot of potential hiccups along the way.

For the past 12 months, the waters of the South China Sea have been fairly tranquil. However, long-time, and hence jaded, observers of one of Asia’s most intractable disputes understand the cyclical nature of tensions; and also know that given the unchanging central drivers of the conflict and the absence of collective political will to palliate those drivers and negotiate an equitable solution, periods of calm are invariably followed by strong tempests.

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China and the U.S. have entered into a new structure, namely an emerging dual leadership structure, in the Asia-Pacific. This trend represents the future direction of U.S.-China relations.

When US President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) this past January, many observers saw that decision as a boon for China. East Asia countries can no longer count on US-supplied public goods to maintain peace and deliver prosperity, they will face some tough choices.

ASEAN’s commitment to regional consensus and to global inclusiveness has been one of the world’s most successful diplomatic initiatives of the past fifty years. While nationalists in China and Vietnam as well as global media remain fixated on sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, faster growth of the developing world than the developed world is the tectonic trend in the world political economy.